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Abstract
The large integration of variable energy resources
is expected to shift a large part of the energy ex-
changes closer to real-time, where more accurate
forecasts are available. In this context, the short-
term electricity markets and in particular the in-
traday market are considered a suitable trading
floor for these exchanges to occur. A key compo-
nent for the successful renewable energy sources
integration is the usage of energy storage. In this
paper, we propose a novel modelling framework
for the strategic participation of energy storage in
the European continuous intraday market where
exchanges occur through a centralized order book.
The goal of the storage device operator is the max-
imization of the profits received over the entire
trading horizon, while taking into account the op-
erational constraints of the unit. The sequential
decision-making problem of trading in the intra-
day market is modelled as a Markov Decision
Process. An asynchronous distributed version
of the fitted Q iteration algorithm is chosen for
solving this problem due to its sample efficiency.
The large and variable number of the existing
orders in the order book motivates the use of high-
level actions and an alternative state representa-
tion. Historical data are used for the generation
of a large number of artificial trajectories in order
to address exploration issues during the learning
process. The resulting policy is back-tested and
compared against a benchmark strategy that is the
current industrial standard. Results indicate that
the agent converges to a policy that achieves in
average higher total revenues than the benchmark
strategy.
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1. Introduction
The vast integration of renewable energy resources (RES)
into (future) power systems, as directed by the recent world-
wide energy policy drive (The European Commission, 2017),
has given rise to challenges related to the security, sustain-
ability and affordability of the power system (“The Energy
Trilemma”). The impact of high RES penetration on the
modern short-term electricity markets has been the subject
of extensive research over the last few years. Short-term
electricity markets in Europe are organized as a sequence of
trading opportunities where participants can trade energy in
the day-ahead market and can later adjust their schedule in
the intraday market until the physical delivery. Deviations
from this schedule are then corrected by the transmission
system operator (TSO) in real time and the responsible
parties are penalized for their imbalances (Meeus & Schit-
tekatte, 2017).
Imbalance penalties serve as an incentive for all market
participants to accurately forecast their production and con-
sumption and to trade based on these forecasts (Scharff
& Amelin, 2016). Due to the variability and the lack of
predictability of RES, the output planned in the day-ahead
market may differ significantly from the actual RES output
in real time (Karanfil & Li, 2017). Since the RES fore-
cast error decreases substantially with a shorter prediction
horizon, the intraday market allows RES operators to trade
these deviations whenever an improved forecast is available
(Borggrefe & Neuhoff, 2011). As a consequence, intraday
trading is expected to reduce the costs related to the reser-
vation and activation of capacity for balancing purposes.
The intraday market is therefore a key aspect towards the
cost-efficient RES integration and enhanced system security
of supply.
Owing to the fact that commitment decisions are taken close
to real time, the intraday market is a suitable market floor
for the participation of flexible resources (i.e. units able to
rapidly increase or decrease their generation/consumption).
However, fast-ramping thermal units (e.g. gas power plants)
incur a high cost when forced to modify their output, to
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operate in part load, or to frequently start up and shut down.
The increased cost related to the cycling of these units will
be reflected to the offers in the intraday market (Pe´rez Ar-
riaga & Knittel et al, 2016). Alternatively, flexible storage
devices (e.g. pumped hydro storage units or batteries) with
low cycling and zero fuel cost can offer their flexibility at a
comparatively low price, close to the gate closure. Hence,
they are expected to play a key role in the intraday market.
1.1. Intraday markets in Europe
In Europe, the intraday markets are organized in two distinct
designs, namely auction-based or continuous trading.
In auction-based intraday markets, participants can submit
their offers to produce or consume energy at a certain time
slot until gate closure. After the gate closure, the submitted
offers are used to form the aggregate demand and supply
curves. The intersection of the aggregate curves defines
the clearing price and quantity (Neuhoff et al., 2016). The
clearing rule is uniform pricing, according to which there
is only one clearing price at which all transactions occur.
Participants are incentivized to bid at their marginal cost
since they are paid at the uniform price. This mechanism
increases price transparency, although it leads to inefficien-
cies, since imbalances after the gate closure can no longer
be traded (Hagemann, 2015).
In continuous intraday (CID) markets, participants can sub-
mit at any point during the trading session orders to buy
or to sell energy. The orders are treated according to the
first come first served (FCFS) rule. A transaction occurs as
soon as the price of a new “Buy” (“Sell”) order is equal or
higher (lower) than the price of an existing “Sell” (“Buy”)
order. Each transaction is settled following the pay-as-bid
principle, stating that the transaction price is specified by the
oldest order of the two present in the order book. Unmatched
orders are stored in the order book and are accessible to all
market participants. The energy delivery resolution offered
by the CID market in Europe ranges between hourly, 30-
minute and 15-minute products, and the gate closure takes
place between five and 60 minutes before actual delivery.
Continuous trading gives the opportunity to market partici-
pants to trade imbalances as soon as they appear (Hagemann,
2015). However, the FCFS rule is inherently associated with
lower allocative inefficiency compared to auction rules. This
implies that, depending on the time of arrival of the orders,
some trades with a positive welfare contribution may not oc-
cur while others with negative welfare contribution may be
realised (Henriot, 2014). It is observed that a combination of
continuous and auction-based intraday markets can increase
the market efficiency in terms of liquidity and market depth,
and results in reduced price volatility (Neuhoff et al., 2016).
In practice, the available contracts (“Sell” and “Buy” orders)
can be categorized into three types:
• The market order, where no price limit is specified (the
order is matched at the best price)
• The limit order, which contains a price limit and can
only be matched at that or at a better price
• The market sweep order, which is executed immedi-
ately (fully or partially) or gets cancelled.
Limit orders may appear with restrictions related to their
execution and their validity. For instance, an order that
carries the specification Fill or Kill should either be fully
and immediately executed or cancelled. An order that is
specified as All or Nothing remains in the order book until
it is entirely executed (Balardy, 2017a).
The European Network Codes and specifically the capacity
allocation and congestion management guidelines (Meeus
& Schittekatte, 2017) (CACM GL) suggest that continu-
ous trading should be the main intraday market mechanism.
Complementary regional intraday auctions can also be put
in place if they are approved by the regulatory authorities
(Meeus & Schittekatte, 2017). To that direction, the Cross-
Border Intraday (XBID) Initiative (Spot, 2018) has enabled
continuous cross-border intraday trading across Europe. Par-
ticipants of each country have access to orders placed from
participants of any other country in the consortium through
a centralized order book, provided that there is available
cross-border capacity.
1.2. Bidding strategies in literature
The strategic participation of power producers in short-term
electricity markets has been extensively studied in the lit-
erature. In order to co-optimise the decisions made in the
sequential trading floors from day-ahead to real time the
problem has been traditionally addressed using multi-stage
stochastic optimisation. Each decision stage corresponds to
a trading floor (i.e. day-ahead, capacity markets, real-time),
where the final decisions take into account uncertainty using
stochastic processes. In particular, the influence that the
producer may have on the market price formation leads to
the distinction between “price-maker” and “price-taker” and
results in a different modelling of the uncertainty.
In (Baillo et al., 2004), the optimisation of a portfolio of gen-
erating assets over three trading floors (i.e. the day-ahead,
the adjustment and the reserves market) is proposed, where
the producer is assumed to be a “price-maker”. The offering
strategy of the producer is a result of the stochastic residual
demand curve as well as the behaviour of the rest of the
market players. On the contrary, a “price-taker” producer
is considered in (Plazas et al., 2005) for the first two stages
of the problem studied, namely the day-ahead and the au-
tomatic generation control (AGC) market. However, since
the third-stage (balancing market) traded volumes are small,
A Deep Reinforcement Learning Framework for Continuous Intraday Market Bidding
the producer can negatively affect the prices with its partici-
pation. Price scenarios are generated using ARIMA models
for the two first stages, whereas for the third stage a linear
curve with negative slope is used to represent the influence
of the producer’s offered capacity on the market price.
Hydro-power plant participation in short-term markets ac-
counting for the technical constraints and several reservoir
levels is formulated and solved in (Fleten & Kristoffersen,
2007). Optimal bidding curves for the participation of
a “price-taker” hydro-power producer in the Nordic spot
market are derived accounting for price uncertainty. In
(Boomsma et al., 2014), the bidding strategy of a two-level
reservoir plant is casted as a multi-stage stochastic program
in order to represent the different sequential trading floors,
namely the day-ahead spot market and the hour-ahead bal-
ancing market. The effects of coordinated bidding and
the “price-maker” versus “price-taker” assumptions on the
generated profits are evaluated. In (PandZˇic´ et al., 2013),
bidding strategies for a virtual power plant (VPP) buying
and selling energy in the day-ahead and the balancing mar-
ket in the form of a multi-stage stochastic optimisation are
investigated. The VPP aggregates a pumped hydro energy
storage (PHES) unit as well as a conventional generator with
stochastic intermittent power production and consumption.
The goal of the VPP operator is the maximization of the
expected profits under price uncertainty.
In these approaches, the intraday market is considered as
auction-based and it is modelled as a single recourse action.
For each trading period, the optimal offered quantity is
derived according to the realization of various stochastic
variables. However, in reality, for most European countries,
according to the EU Network Codes (Meeus & Schittekatte,
2017), modern intraday market trading will primarily be a
continuous process.
The strategic participation in the CID market is investigated
for the case of an RES producer in (Henriot, 2014) and
(Garnier & Madlener, 2015). In both works, the problem is
formulated as a sequential decision-making process, where
the operator adjusts its offers during the trading horizon, ac-
cording to the RES forecast updates for the physical delivery
of power. Additionally, in (Go¨nsch & Hassler, 2016) the use
of a PHES unit is proposed to undertake energy arbitrage
and to offset potential deviations. The trading process is
formulated as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) where the
future commitment decision in the market is based on the
stochastic realization of the intraday price, the imbalance
penalty, the RES production and the storage availability.
The volatility of the CID prices, along with the quality of the
forecast updates, are found to be key factors that influence
the degree of activity and success of the deployed bidding
strategies (Henriot, 2014). Therefore, the CID prices and
the forecast errors are considered as correlated stochastic
processes in (Garnier & Madlener, 2015). Alternatively,
in (Henriot, 2014), the CID price is constructed as a linear
function of the offered quantity with an increasing slope
as the gate closure approaches. In this way, the scarcity of
conventional units approaching real time is reflected. In
(Go¨nsch & Hassler, 2016), real weather data and market
data are used to simulate the forecast error and CID price
processes.
For the sequential decision-making problem in the CID mar-
ket, the offered quantity of energy is the decision variable to
be optimised (Garnier & Madlener, 2015). The optimisation
is carried out using Approximate Dynamic Programming
(ADP) methods, where a parameterised policy is obtained
based on the observed stochastic processes for the price, the
RES error and the level of the reservoir (Go¨nsch & Hassler,
2016). The ADP approach presented in (Go¨nsch & Hassler,
2016) is compared in (Hassler, 2017) to some threshold-
based heuristic decision rules. The parameters are updated
according to simulation-based experience and the obtained
performance is comparable to the ADP algorithm. The ob-
tained decision rules are intuitively interpretable and are
derived efficiently through simulation-based optimisation.
The bidding strategy deployed by a storage device operator
participating in a slightly different real-time market orga-
nized by NYISO is presented in (Jiang & Powell, 2014).
In this market, the commitment decision is taken one hour
ahead of real-time and the settlements occur intra-hour every
five minutes. In this setting, the storage operator selects two
price thresholds at which the intra-hour settlements occur.
The problem is formulated as an MDP and is solved using an
ADP algorithm that exploits a particular monotonicity prop-
erty. A distribution-free variant that assumes no knowledge
of the price distribution is proposed. The optimal policy is
trained using historical real-time price data.
Even though the focus of the mentioned articles lies on
the CID market, the trading decisions are considered to
take place in discrete time-steps. A different approach is
presented in (Aı¨d et al., 2016), where the CID market par-
ticipation is modelled as a continuous time process using
stochastic differential equations (SDE). The Hamilton Ja-
cobi Bellman (HJB) equation is used for the determination
of the optimal trading strategy. The goal is the minimization
of the imbalance cost faced by a power producer arising
from the residual error between the RES production and
demand. The optimal trading rate is derived assuming a
stochastic process for the market price using real market
data and the residual error.
In the approaches presented so far, the CID price is mod-
elled as a stochastic process assuming that the participating
agent is a “price-taker”. However, in the CID market, this
assumption implies that the CID market is liquid and the
price at which one can buy or sell energy at a given time
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are similar or the same. This assumption does not always
hold, since the mean bid-ask spread in a trading session
in the German intraday market for 2015 was several hun-
dred times larger than the tick-size (i.e. the minimum price
movement of a trading instrument) (Balardy, 2017b). It is
also reported in the same study that the spread decreases as
trading approaches the gate closure.
An approach that explicitly considers the order book is
presented in (Bertrand & Papavasiliou, 2019). A threshold-
based policy is used to optimise the bid acceptance for stor-
age units participating in the CID market. A collection of
different factors such as the time of the day are used for the
adaptation of the price thresholds. The threshold policy is
trained using a policy gradient method (REINFORCE) and
the results show improved performance against the “rolling
intrinsic” benchmark. In this paper, we present a methodol-
ogy that serves as a wrapper around the existing industrial
state of the art. We provide a generic modelling framework
for the problem and we elaborate on all the assumptions that
allow the formulation of the problem as an MDP. We solve
the resulting problem using a value function approximation
method.
1.3. Contribution of the paper
In this paper, we focus on the sequential decision-making
problem of a storage device operator participating in the
CID market. Firstly, we present a novel modelling frame-
work for the CID market, where the trading agents exchange
energy via a centralized order book. Each trading agent is
assumed to dynamically select the orders that maximize its
benefits throughout the trading horizon. In contrast to the
existing literature, all the available orders are considered
explicitly with the intention to uncover more information at
each trading decision. The liquidity of the market and the
influence of each agent on the price are directly reflected in
the observed order book, and the developed strategies can
adapt accordingly. Secondly, we model explicitly the dy-
namics of the storage system. Finally, the resulting problem
is cast as an MDP.
The intraday trading problem of a storage device is solved
using Deep Reinforcement Learning techniques, specifically
an asynchronous distributed variant of the fitted Q iteration
RL algorithm with deep neural networks as function approx-
imators (Ernst et al., 2005). Due to the high-dimensionality
and the dynamically evolving size of the order book, we
motivate the use of high-level actions and a constant size,
low-dimensional state representation. The agent can select
between trading and idling. The goal of the selected actions
is the identification of the opportunity cost of trading given
the state of the order book observed and the maximization
of the total return over the trading horizon. The resulting op-
timal policy is evaluated using real data from the German ID
market (EPEXSPOT, 2017). In summary, the contributions
of this work are the following:
• We model the CID market trading process as an MDP
where the energy exchanges occur explicitly through a
centralized order book. The trading policy is adapted
to the state of the order book.
• The operational constraints of the storage device are
considered explicitly.
• A state space reduction is proposed in order to deal
with the size of the order book.
• A novel representation of high-level actions is used
to identify the opportunity cost between trading and
idling.
• The fitted Q iteration algorithm is used to find a time-
variant policy that maximizes the total cumulative prof-
its collected.
• Artificial trajectories are produced using historical data
from the German CID market in order to address ex-
ploration issues.
1.4. Outline of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
the CID market trading framework is presented. The inter-
action of the trading agents via a centralized order book is
formulated as a dynamic process. All the available informa-
tion for an asset trading agent is detailed and the objective
is defined as the cumulative profits. In Section 3, all the
assumptions necessary to formulate the bidding process in
the CID market as an MDP are listed. The methodology
utilised to find an optimal policy that maximizes the cumu-
lative profits of the proposed MDP is detailed in Section 4.
A case study using real data from the German CID market
is performed in Section 5. The results as well as consider-
ations about limitations of the developed methodology are
discussed in Section 6. Finally, conclusions of this work are
drawn and future recommendations are provided in Section
7. A detailed nomenclature is provided at the Appendix A.
2. Continuous Intraday Bidding process
2.1. Continuous Intraday market design
The participation in the CID market is a continuous process
similar to the stock exchange. Each market product x ∈ X ,
where X is the set of all available products, is defined as
the physical delivery of energy in a pre-defined time slot.
The time slot corresponding to product x is defined by its
starting point tdelivery(x) and its duration λ (x). The trading
process for time slot x opens at topen(x) and closes at tclose(x).
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Figure 1. Trading (continuous and discrete) and delivery timelines for products Q1 to Q4
During the time interval t ∈ [topen(x), tclose(x)], a participant
can exchange energy with other participants for the lagged
physical delivery during the interval δ (x), with:
δ (x) =
[
tdelivery(x), tdelivery(x)+λ (x)
]
.
The exchange of energy takes place through a centralized
order book that contains all the unmatched orders o j, where
j ∈ Nt corresponds to a unique index that every order re-
ceives upon arrival. The set Nt ⊆ N gathers all the unique
indices of the orders available at time t. We denote the status
of the order book at time t by Ot = (o j,∀ j ∈ Nt). As time
progresses new orders appear and existing ones are either
accepted or cancelled.
Trading for a set of products is considered to start at the gate
opening of the first product and to finish at the gate closure
of the last product. More formally, considering an ordered
set of available products X = {Q1, ...Q96}, the correspond-
ing trading horizon is defined as T = [topen(Q1), tclose(Q96)].
For instance, in the German CID market, trading of hourly
(quarterly) products for day D opens at 3 pm (4 pm) of day
D−1 respectively. For each product x, the gate closes 30
minutes before the actual energy delivery at tdelivery(x). The
timeline for trading products Q1 to Q4 that correspond to
the physical delivery in 15-minute time slots from 00:00
until 01:00, is presented in Figure 1. It can be observed
that the agent can trade for all products until 23:30. After
each subsequent gate closure the number of available prod-
ucts decreases and the commitment for the corresponding
time slot is defined. Potential deviations during the physical
delivery of energy are penalized in the imbalance market.
2.2. Continuous Intraday market environment
As its name indicates, the CID market is a continuous en-
vironment. In order to solve the trading problem presented
in this paper, it has been decided to perform a relevant dis-
cretisation operation. As shown in Figure 1, the trading
timeline is discretised in a high number of time-steps of
constant duration ∆t. Each discretised trading interval for
product x can be denoted by the set of time-steps T (x) ={
topen(x), topen(x)+∆t, ..., tclose(x)−∆t, tclose(x)
}
. Then,
the discrete-time trading opportunities for the entire set
of products X can be modelled such that the time-steps are
defined as t ∈ T =⋃x∈X T (x). In the following, for the sake
of clarity, the increment (decrement) operation t+1 (t−1)
will be used to model the discrete transition from time-step
t to time-step t+∆t (t−∆t).
It is important to note that in theory the discretisation opera-
tion leads to suboptimalities in the decision-making process.
However, as the discretisation becomes finer (∆t→ 0), the
decisions taken can be considered near-optimal. Increas-
ing the granularity of the decision time-line results in an
increase of the number of decisions that can be taken and
hence, the size of the decision-making problem. Thus, there
is a clear trade-off between complexity and quality of the
resulting decisions when using a finite discretisation.
Let Xt denote the set of available products at time-step t ∈ T
A Deep Reinforcement Learning Framework for Continuous Intraday Market Bidding
such that:
Xt = {x|x ∈ X , t ≤ tclose(x)} .
We define the state of the CID market environment at time-
step t as sOBt =Ot ∈ SOB. The state contains the observation
of the order book at time-step t ∈ T i.e. the unmatched
orders for all the available products x ∈ Xt ⊂ X .
A set of n agents I = {1,2, ...,n} are continuously interact-
ing in the CID environment exchanging energy. Each agent
i∈ I can express its willingness to buy or sell energy by post-
ing at instant t a set of new orders ai,t ∈ Ai in the order book,
which results in the joint action at = (a1,t , ...,an,t)∈∏ni=1Ai.
The process of designing the set of new orders ai,t for agent
i at instant t consists, for each new order, in determining
the product x ∈ Xt , the side of the order y ∈ {“Sell”,“Buy”},
the volume v ∈ R+, the price level p ∈ [pmin, pmax] of each
unit offered to be produced or consumed, and the various
validity and execution specifications e ∈ E. The index of
each new order j belongs to the set j ∈ N′t .
The set of new orders is defined as ai,t =
((x j,y j,v j, p j,e j),∀ j ∈ N′t ⊆ N). We will use the no-
tation for the joint action at = (ai,t ,a−i,t) to refer to the
action that agent i selects ai,t and the joint action that all
other agents use a−i,t = (a1,t , ...,ai−1,t ,ai+1.t , ...,an,t).
Table 1. Order Book for Q1 and time slot 00:00-00:15
i Side v [MW] p [e/MWh]
4 “Sell” 6.25 36.3
2 “Sell” 2.35 34.5 ←− ask
1 “Buy” 3.15 33.8 ←− bid
3 “Buy” 1.125 29.3
5 “Buy” 2.5 15.9
The orders are treated according to the first come first served
(FCFS) rule. Table 1 presents an observation of the order
book for product Q1. The difference between the most
expensive “Buy” order (“bid”) and the cheapest “Sell” order
(“ask”) defines the bid-ask spread of the product. A deal
between two counter-parties is struck when the price pbuy
of a “Buy” order and the price psell of a “Sell” order satisfy
the condition pbuy ≥ psell . This condition is tested at the
arrival of each new order. The volume of the transaction is
defined as the minimum quantity between the “Buy” and
“Sell” order (min(vbuy,vsell)). The residual volume remains
available in the market at the same price. As mentioned in
the previous section, each transaction is settled following
the pay-as-bid principle, at the price indicated by the oldest
order.
Finally, at each time-step t, every agent i observes the state
of the order book sOBt , performs certain actions (posting a
set of new orders) ai,t , inducing a transition which can be
represented by the following equation:
sOBt+1 = f (s
OB
t ,ai,t ,a−i,t). (1)
2.3. Asset trading
An asset optimizing agent participating in the CID market
can adjust its position for product x until the correspond-
ing gate closure tclose(x). However, the physical delivery
of power is decided at tdelivery(x). An additional amount
of information (potentially valuable for certain players) is
received during the period
{
tclose(x), .., tdelivery(x)
}
, from
the gate closure until the delivery of power. Based on this
updated information, an asset-trading agent may need to or
have an incentive to deviate from the net contracted power
in the market.
Let vconi,t = (v
con
i,t (x),∀x ∈ Xt) ∈ R|Xt |, gather the volumes of
power contracted by agent i for the available products x ∈ Xt
at each time-step t ∈ T . In the following, we will adopt the
convention for vconi,t (x) to be positive when agent i contracts
the net volume to sell (produce) and negative when the agent
contracts the volume to buy (consume) energy for product x
at time-step t.
Following each market transition as indicated by equation
(1), the volumes contracted vconi,t are determined based on
the transactions that have occurred. The contracted volumes
vconi,t are derived according to the FCFS rule that is detailed
in (EPEXSPOT, 2019). The mathematical formulation of
the clearing algorithm is provided in (Le et al., 2019). The
objective function of the clearing algorithm is comprised
of two terms, namely the social welfare and a penalty term
modelling the price-time priority rule. The orders that maxi-
mize this objective are matched, provided that they satisfy
the balancing equations and constraints related to their spec-
ifications. The clearing rule is implicitly given by:
vconi,t = clear(i,s
OB
t ,ai,t ,a−i,t). (2)
We denote as Pmari,t (x) ∈ R the net contracted power in the
market by agent i for each product x ∈ X , which is updated
at every time-step t ∈ T according to:
Pmari,t+1(x) = P
mar
i,t (x)+ v
con
i,t (x). (3)
∀x ∈ Xt
The discretisation of the delivery timeline T¯ is done with
time-steps of duration ∆τ , equal to the minimum duration of
delivery for the products considered. The discrete delivery
timeline T¯ is considered to start at the beginning of delivery
of the first product τinit and to finish at the end of the delivery
of the last product τterm. For the simple case where only four
quarterly products are considered, as shown in Figure 1, the
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delivery time-step is ∆τ = 15min and the delivery timeline
T¯ = {00 : 00,00 : 15, ...,01 : 00}, where τinit = 00 : 00 and
τterm = 01 : 00. In general, when only one type of product
is considered (e.g. quarterly), there is a straightforward
relation between time of delivery τ and product x, since
τ = tdelivery(x) and ∆τ = λ (x). Thus, terms x or τ can be
used interchangeably. For the sake of keeping the notation
relatively simple, we will only consider quarterly products
in the rest of the paper. In such a context, the terms Pmari,t (τ)
or Pmari,t (x) can be used interchangeably to denote the net
contracted power in the market by agent i at trading step t
for delivery time-step τ (product x).
As the trading process evolves the set of delivery time-steps
τ for which the asset-optimizing can make decisions de-
creases as trading time t crosses the delivery time τ . Let
T¯ (t) ⊆ T¯ be a function that yields the subset of delivery
time-steps τ ∈ T¯ that follow time-step t ∈ T such that:
T¯ (t) = {τ|τ ∈ T¯ \{τterm} , t ≤ τ} .
The participation of an asset-optimizing agent in the CID
market is composed of two coupled decision processes with
different timescales. First, the trading process where a deci-
sion is taken at each time-step t about the energy contracted
until the gate closure tclose(x). During this process, the agent
can decide about its position in the market and create scenar-
ios/make projections about the actual delivery plan based on
its position. Second, the physical delivery decision that is
taken at the time of the delivery τ or tdelivery(x) based on the
total net contracted power in the market during the trading
process.
An agent i participating in the CID market is assumed to
monitor the state of the order book sOBt and its net con-
tracted power in the market Pmari,t (x) for each product x ∈ X ,
which becomes fixed once the gate closure occurs at tclose(x).
Depending on the role it presumes in the market, an asset-
optimizing agent is assumed to monitor all the available
information about its assets. We distinguish the three fol-
lowing cases among the many different roles that can be
played by an agent in the CID market:
• The agent controls a physical asset that can generate
and/or consume electricity. We define as Gi,t(τ) ∈[
Gi,Gi
]
the power production level for agent i at de-
livery time-step τ as computed at trading step t. In a
similar way, we define the power consumption level
Ci,t(τ)∈
[
Ci,Ci
]
, whereCi,Ci,Gi,Gi ∈R+. We further
assume that the actual production gi,t(t ′) and consump-
tion level ci,t(t ′) during the time-period of delivery
t ′ ∈ [τ,τ+∆τ), is constant for each product x such
that:
gi,t(t ′) = Gi,t(τ), (4)
ci,t(t ′) =Ci,t(τ), (5)
∀t ′ ∈ [τ,τ+∆τ) .
At each time-step t during the trading process, agent i
can decide to adjust its generation level by ∆Gi,t(τ) or
its consumption level by ∆Ci,t(τ). According to these
adjustments the generation and consumption levels can
be updated at each time-step t according to:
Gi,t+1(τ) = Gi,t(τ)+∆Gi,t(τ), (6)
Ci,t+1(τ) =Ci,t(τ)+∆Ci,t(τ), (7)
∀τ ∈ T¯ (t).
Let wexogi,t denote any other relevant exogenous informa-
tion to agent i such as the RES forecast, a forecast of the
actions of other agents, or the imbalance prices. The
computation of ∆Gi,t(·) and ∆Ci,t(·) depends on the
market position, the technical limits of the assets, the
state of the order book and the exogenous information
wexogi,t . We define the residual production P
res
i,t (τ) ∈ R
at delivery time-step τ as the difference between the
production and the consumption levels and can be com-
puted by:
Presi,t (τ) = Gi,t(τ)−Ci,t(τ). (8)
We note that the amount of residual production Presi,t (τ)
aggregates the combined effects that Gi,t(τ) andCi,t(τ)
have on the revenues made by agent i through interact-
ing with the markets (intraday/imbalance).
The level of generation and consumption for a market
period τ can be adjusted at any time-step t before the
physical delivery τ , but it becomes binding when t = τ .
We denote as ∆i,t(τ) the deviation from the market
position for each time-step τ , as scheduled at time t,
after having computed the variables Gi,t(τ) andCi,t(τ),
as follows:
Pmari,t (τ)+∆i,t(τ) = P
res
i,t (τ), (9)
∀τ ∈ T¯ (t).
The term ∆i,t(τ) represents the imbalance for mar-
ket period τ as estimated at time t. This imbal-
ance may evolve up to time t = τ . We denote by
∆i(τ) = ∆i,t=τ(τ) the final imbalance for market pe-
riod τ .
The power balance of equation (9) written for time-step
t+1 is given by:
Pmari,t+1(τ)+∆i,t+1(τ) = Gi,t+1(τ)−Ci,t+1(τ) (10)
∀τ ∈ T¯ (t+1).
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It can be observed that by substituting equations (3),
(6) and (7) in equation (10) we have:
Pmari,t (τ)+ v
con
i,t (τ)+∆i,t+1(τ) =
Gi,t(τ)+∆Gi,t(τ)− (Ci,t(τ)+∆Ci,t(τ)) (11)
∀τ ∈ T¯ (t).
The combination of equations (8) and (9) with equa-
tion (11) yields the update of the imbalance vector
according to:
∆i,t+1(τ) = ∆i,t(τ)+∆Gi,t(τ)−∆Ci,t(τ)− vconi,t (τ)
(12)
∀τ ∈ T¯ (t).
• The agent does not own any physical asset (market
maker). It is equivalent to the first case with Ci =Ci =
Gi = Gi = 0. The net imbalance ∆i,t(τ) is updated at
every time-step t ∈ T according to:
Pmari,t (τ)+∆i,t(τ) = 0, (13)
∀τ ∈ T¯ (t).
• The agent controls a storage device that can produce,
store and consume energy. We can consider an agent
controlling a storage device as an agent that controls
generation and production assets with specific con-
straints on the generation and the consumption level
related to the nature of the storage device. Following
this argument, let Gi,t(τ) (Ci,t(τ)) refer to the level of
discharging (charging) of the storage device for de-
livery time-step τ , updated at time t. Obviously, if
Gi,t(τ) > 0 (Ci,t(τ) > 0), then we automatically have
Ci,t(τ) = 0 (Gi,t(τ) = 0) since a battery cannot charge
and discharge energy at the same time. In this case,
agent i can decide to adjust its discharging (charging)
level by ∆Gi,t(τ) (∆Ci,t(τ)). Let SoCi,t(τ) denote the
state of charge of the storage unit at delivery time-
step τ ∈ T¯ as it is computed at time-step t, where
SoCi,t(τ) ∈
[
SoCi,SoCi
]
. The evolution of the state
of charge during the delivery timeline can be updated
at decision time-step t as:
SoCi,t(τ+∆τ) = SoCi,t(τ)+
∆τ ·
(
ηCi,t(τ)−Gi,t(τ)η
)
, (14)
∀τ ∈ T¯ (t).
Parameter η represents the charging and discharging
efficiencies of the storage unit which, for simplicity,
we assume are equal. We note that for batteries, charg-
ing and discharging efficiencies may be different and
depend on the charging/discharging speeds. As can be
observed from equation (14), time-coupling constraints
are imposed on Ci,t(τ) and Gi,t(τ) in order to ensure
that the amount of energy that can be discharged dur-
ing some period already exists in the storage device.
Additionally, constraints associated with the maximum
charging powerCi and discharging power Gi, as well as
the maximum and minimum energy level (SoCi, SoCi)
are considered in order to model the operation of the
storage device.
Equation (14) can be written for time-step t+1 as:
SoCi,t+1(τ+∆τ) = SoCi,t+1(τ)+
∆τ ·
(
ηCi,t+1(τ)− Gi,t+1(τ)η
)
,
(15)
∀τ ∈ T¯ (t+1).
Combining equations (14) and (15) we can derive
the updated vector of the state of charge at time-
step t + 1 depending on the decided adjustments
(∆Gi,t(τ),∆Ci,t(τ)) as:
SoCi,t+1(τ+∆τ)−SoCi,t+1(τ) =
SoCi,t(τ+∆τ)−SoCi,t(τ)+
∆τ · (η∆Ci,t(τ)− ∆Gi,t(τ)η ), (16)
∀τ ∈ T¯ (t).
The state of charge SoCi,t(τ) at delivery time-step τ can
be updated until t = τ . Let us also observe that there is
a bijection between Presi,t (τ) and the terms Ci,t(τ) and
Gi,t(τ) or, in other words, determining Presi,t is equiva-
lent to determining Ci,t(τ) and Gi,t(τ) and vice versa.
The deviation from the committed schedule ∆i,t+1(τ)
at delivery time-step τ at each time-step t+1 can be
computed by equation (12).
All the new information arriving at time-step t for an
asset-optimizing agent i (controlling a storage device)
is gathered in variable:
si,t = (sOBt ,
(Pmari,t (τ),∆i,t(τ),Gi,t(τ),Ci,t(τ),SoCi,t(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ ),
wexogi,t ) ∈ Si.
The control action applied by an asset-optimizing agent
i trading in the CID market at time-step t consists of
posting new orders in the CID market and adjusting its
production/consumption level or equivalently its charg-
ing/discharging level for the case of the storage device.
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The control actions can be summarised in variable ui,t =
(ai,t ,(∆Ci,t(τ),∆Gi,t(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ )).
In this paper, we consider that the trading agent adopts
a simple strategy for determining, at each time-step t, the
variables ∆Ci,t(τ), ∆Gi,t(τ) once the trading actions ai,t have
been selected. In this case, the decision regarding the trading
actions ai,t fully defines action ui,t and thus the notation ui,t
will not be further used. This strategy will be referred to in
the rest of the paper as the “default” strategy for managing
the storage device. According to this strategy, the agent aims
at minimizing any imbalances (∆i,t+1(τ)) and therefore we
use the following decision rule:
(∆Ci,t(τ),∆Gi,t(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ ) = argmin∑
τ∈T¯
| ∆i,t+1(τ) |,
s.t. (2), (3), (8), (9), (12), (14). (17)
One can easily see that from equation (11) this decision
rule is equivalent to imposing Presi,t+1(τ) as close as possible
to Pmari,t+1(τ), given the operational constraints of the device.
We will elaborate later in this paper on the fact that adopting
such a strategy is not suboptimal in a context where the
agent needs to be balanced for every market period while
being an aggressor in the CID market.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the decision
process of an asset-optimizing agent terminates at the gate
closure tclose(x) along with the trading process. Thus, the
final residual production Presi (τ) for delivery time-step τ
is given by Presi (τ) = Presi,t=tclose(x)(τ). Similarly, the final
imbalance is provided by ∆i(τ) = ∆i,t=tclose(x)(τ).
Although this approach can be used for the optimisation of
a portfolio of assets, in this paper, the focus lies on the case
where the agent is operating a storage device. We note that
this case is particularly interesting in the context of energy
transition, where storage devices are expected to play a key
role in the energy market.
2.4. Trading rewards
The instantaneous reward signal collected after each transi-
tion for agent i is given by:
ri,t = Ri (t,si,t ,ai,t ,a−i,t) , (18)
where Ri : T ×Si×A1× ...×An→ R.
The reward function Ri is composed of the following terms:
i. The trading revenues obtained from the matching pro-
cess of orders at time-step t, given by ρ where ρ is a
stationary function ρ : SOB×A1× ...×An→ R,
ii. The imbalance penalty for deviation ∆i(τ) from the
market position for delivery time-step τ at the imbal-
ance price I(τ). The imbalance settlement process for
product x ∈ X (delivery time-step τ) takes place at the
end of the physical delivery tsettle(x) (i.e. at τ+∆τ), as
presented in Figure 1. We define the imbalance settle-
ment timeline T Imb, as T Imb = {τ+∆τ,∀τ ∈ T¯}. The
imbalance penalty1 is only applied when time instance
t is an element of the imbalance settlement timeline.
The function Ri is defined as:
Ri (t,si,t ,ai,t ,a−i,t) =
ρ
(
sOBt ,ai,t ,a−i,t
)
+
{
∆i(τ) · I(τ) , if t ∈ T Imb,
0 ,otherwise
.
(19)
2.5. Trading policy
All the relevant information that summarises the past and
that can be used to optimise the market participation
is assumed to be contained in the history vector hi,t =
(si,0,ai,0,ri,0, ...,si,t−1,ai,t−1,ri,t−1,si,t) ∈ Hi. Trading agent
i is assumed to select its actions following a non-anticipative
history-dependent policy pii(hi,t) ∈Π from the set of all ad-
missible policies Π, according to: ai,t ∼ pii(·|hi,t).
2.6. Trading objective
The return collected by agent i in a single trajectory ζ =
(si,0,ai,0, ...,ai,K−1,si,K) of K−1 time-steps, given an initial
state si,0 = si ∈ Si, which is the sum of cumulated rewards
over this trajectory is given by:
Gζ (si) =
K−1
∑
t=0
Ri (t,si,t ,ai,t ,a−i,t) |si,0 = si. (20)
The sum of returns collected by agent i, where each agent i
is following a randomized policy pii ∈Π are consequently
given by:
V pii(si) = E
ai,t∼pii,a−i,t∼pi−i
{
K−1
∑
t=0
Ri (t,si,t ,ai,t ,a−i,t) |si,0 = si
}
.
(21)
The goal of the trading agent i is to identify an optimal
policy pi∗i ∈Π that maximizes the expected sum of rewards
collected along a trajectory. An optimal policy is obtained
by:
pi∗i = argmaxpii∈ΠV
pii(si). (22)
1The imbalance price I(τ) is defined by a process that depends
on a plethora of factors among which is the net system imbalance
during delivery period τ , defined by the imbalance volumes of all
the market players (∑I ∆i(τ)). For the sake of simplicity we will
assume that it is randomly sampled from a known distribution over
prices that is not conditioned on any variable.
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3. Reinforcement Learning Formulation
In this section, we propose a series of assumptions that
allow us to formulate the previously introduced problem of
a storage device operator trading in the CID market using
a reinforcement learning (RL) framework. Based on these
assumptions, the decision-making problem is cast as an
MDP; the action space is tailored in order to represent a
particular market player and additional restrictions on the
operation of the storage device are introduced.
3.1. Assumptions on the decision process
Assumption 1 (Behaviour of the other agents). The other
agents −i interact with the order book in between two dis-
crete time-steps in such a way that agent i can be considered
independent when interacting with the CID market at each
time-step t. Moreover, it is assumed that these actions a−i,t
depend strictly on the history of order book states sOBt−1 and
thus by extension on the history hi,t−1 for every time-step t:
a−i,t ∼ Pa−i,t (·|hi,t−1). (23)
Assumption (1) suggests that the agents engage in a way that
is very similar to a board game like chess, for which player
i can make a move only after players −i have made their
move. This behaviour is illustrated in Figure 1 (magnified
area). Given this assumption, the notation a−i,t can also
be seen as referring to actions selected during the interval
(t−∆t, t).
Assumption 2 (Exogenous information). The exogenous in-
formation wexogi,t is given by a stochastic model that depends
solely on k past values, where 0 < k ≤ t and a random dis-
turbance ei,t according to:
wexogi,t = b(w
exog
i,t−1, ...,w
exog
i,t−k,et), (24)
ei,t ∼ Pei,t (·|hi,t). (25)
Assumption 3 (Strategy for storage control). The control
decisions related to the charging (∆Ci,t(τ)) or discharging
(∆Gi,t(τ)) power to/from the storage device are made based
on the “default” strategy described in Section 2.3.
It can be observed that with such an assumption, the storage
control decisions (∆Ci,t(τ) and ∆Gi,t(τ)) are obtained as a
direct consequence of the trading decisions ai,t . Indeed, after
the trading decisions are submitted and the market position
is updated, the storage control decisions are subsequently
derived following the “default” strategy. Assumption (3)
results in reducing the dimensionality of the action space
and consequently the complexity of the decision-making
problem.
Following Assumptions (1), (2) and (3), one can simply
observe that the decision-making problem faced by an agent
i operating a storage device and trading energy in the CID
market can be formalised as a fully observable finite-time
MDP with the following characteristics:
• Discrete time-step t ∈ T , where T is the optimisation
horizon.
• State space Hi, where the state of the system hi,t ∈Hi at
time t summarises all past information that is relevant
for future optimisation.
• Action space Ai, where ai,t ∈ Ai is the set of new orders
posted by agent i at time-step t.
• Transition probabilities hi,t+1 ∼ P(·|hi,t ,ai,t), that can
be inferred by the following processes:
1. a−i,t ∈ A−i is drawn according to equation (23)
2. The state of the order book sOBt+1 follows the tran-
sition given by equation (1)
3. The exogenous information wexogi,t is given by
equation (24) and the noise by (25)
4. The variable si,t+1 that summarises the informa-
tion of the storage device optimizing agent fol-
lows the transition given by equations (1), (6)-(12)
(24), (25) and (16)
5. The instantaneous reward ri,t collected after each
transition is given by equations (18) and (19).
The elements resulting from these processes can be
used to construct hi,t+1 in a straightforward way.
3.2. Assumptions on the trading actions
Assumption 4 (Aggressor). The trading agent can only sub-
mit new orders that match already existing orders at their
price (i.e. aggressor or liquidity taker).
Let Aredi be the space that contains only actions that
match pre-existing orders in the order book. Accord-
ing to Assumption (4), the ith agent, at time-step t, is
restricted to select actions ai,t ∈ Aredi ⊂ Ai. Let sOBt =
((xOBj ,y
′OB
j ,v
OB
j , p
OB
j ,e
OB
j ),∀ j ∈ Nt) be the order book ob-
servation at trading time-step t. We use y′OB to denote that
the new orders have the opposite side (“Buy” or “Sell”) than
the existing orders. We denote as a ji,t ∈ [0,1] the fraction
of the volume accepted from order j. The reduced action
space Aredi is then defined as:
Aredi = {(xOBj ,y′OBj ,a ji,t · vOBj , pOBj ,eOBj ),a ji,t ∈ [0,1],∀ j ∈ Nt}.
At this point, posting a new set of orders ai,t ∈ Aredi boils
down to simply specifying the vector of fractions:
a¯i,t =
(
a ji,t ,∀ j ∈ Nt
)
∈ A¯redi
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that define the partial or full acceptance of the existing or-
ders. The action ai,t submitted by an aggressor is a function
l of the observed order book sOBt and the vector of fractions
a¯i,t and is given by:
ai,t = l(sOBt , a¯i,t). (26)
3.3. Restrictions on the storage operation
Assumption 5 (No imbalances permitted). The trading agent
can only accept an order to buy or sell energy if and only if it
does not result in any imbalance for the remaining delivery
periods.
According to Assumption (5) the agent is completely risk-
averse in the sense that, even if it stops trading at any given
point, its position in the market can be covered without caus-
ing any imbalance. This assumption is quite restrictive with
respect to the full potential of an asset-optimizing agent in
the CID market. We note that, according to the German
regulation policies (see (Braun & Hoffmann, 2016)), the
imbalance market should not be considered as an optimisa-
tion floor and the storage device should always be balanced
at each trading time-step t (∆i,t(τ) = 0,∀τ ∈ T¯ ). In this
respect, we can view Assumption 5 as a way to comply with
the German regulation policies in a risk-free context where
each new trade should not create an imbalance that would
have to be covered later.
Assumption 6 (Optimization decoupling). The storage de-
vice has a given initial value for the storage level SoCiniti
at the beginning of the delivery timeline. Moreover, it is
constrained to terminate at a given level SoCtermi at the end
of the delivery timeline.
Under Assumption (6) the optimisation of the storage unit
over a long trading horizon can be decomposed into shorter
optimisation windows (e.g. of one day). In the simulation
results reported later in this paper, we will choose SoCiniti =
SoCtermi .
4. Methodology
In this section, we describe the methodology that has been
applied for tackling the MDP problem described in sub-
section 3. We consider that, in reality, an asset-optimizing
agent has at its disposal a set of trajectories (one per day)
from participating in the CID market in the past years. The
process of collecting these trajectories and their structure is
presented in Section 4.1. Based on this dataset, we propose
in subsection 4.2 the deployment of the fitted Q iteration
algorithm as introduced in (Ernst et al., 2005). This algo-
rithm belongs to the class of batch-mode RL algorithms that
make use of all the available samples at once for updating
the policy. This class of algorithms is known to be very
sample efficient.
Despite the different assumptions made on the operation
of the storage device and the way it is restricted to interact
with the market, the dimensionality of the action space
still remains very high. Due to limitations related to the
function approximation architecture used to implement the
fitted Q iteration algorithm, a low-dimensional and discrete
action space is necessary, as discussed in subsection 4.3.
Therefore, as part of the methodology, in subsection 4.4 we
propose a way for reducing the action space. Afterwards,
in subsection 4.5, a more compact representation of the
state space is proposed in order to reduce the computational
complexity of the training process and increase the sample
efficiency of the algorithm.
Finally, the low number of available samples (one trajectory
per day) gives rise to issues related to the limited exploration
of the agent. In order to address these issues, we generate a
large number of trading trajectories of our MDP according
to an ε-greedy policy, using historical trading data. In the
last part of this section, we elaborate on the strategy that
is used in this paper for generating the trajectories and the
limitations of this procedure.
4.1. Collection of trajectories
As previously mentioned, an asset-optimizing agent can col-
lect a set of trajectories from previous interactions with the
CID market. Based on Assumption (6), each day can be op-
timised separately and thus, trading for one day corresponds
to one trajectory. We consider that the trading horizon de-
fined in Section 2.2 consists of K discrete trading time-steps
such that T = {0, ...,K}. A single trajectory sampled from
the MDP described in Section 3 is defined as:
ζm =
(
hmi,0,a
m
i,0,r
m
i,0, ...,h
m
i,K−1,a
m
i,K−1,r
m
i,K−1,h
m
i,K
)
.
A set of M trajectories can be then defined as:
F = {ζm,m= 1, ...,M} .
The set of trajectories F can be used to generate the set of
sampled one-step system transitions F ′ defined as:
F ′ =

(h1i,0,a
1
i,0,r
1
i,0,h
1
i,1), · · · (h1i,K−1,a1i,K−1,r1i,K−1,h1i,K),
...
. . .
...
(hMi,0,a
M
i,0,r
M
i,0,h
M
i,1), · · · (hMi,K−1,aMi,K−1,rMi,K−1,hMi,K)
 .
The set F ′ is split into K sets of one-step system transitions
F ′t defined as:
F ′t =
{
(hmi,t ,a
m
i,t ,r
m
i,t ,h
m
i,t+1),m= 1, ...,M
}
t ,
∀t ∈ {0, ...,K−1} .
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A batch-mode RL algorithm can be implemented for ex-
tracting a relevant trading policy from these one-step system
transitions. In the following subsection, the type of RL al-
gorithm used for inferring a high-quality policy from this
set of one-step system transitions is explained in detail.
4.2. Batch-mode reinforcement learning
Q-functions and Dynamic Programming: In this section,
the fitted Q iteration algorithm is proposed for the optimisa-
tion of the MDP defined in Section 3, using a set of collected
trajectories. In order to solve the problem, we first define
the Q-function for each state-action pair (hi,t ,ai,t) at time t
as proposed in (Bertsekas, 2005) as:
Qt(hi,t ,ai,t) = E
a−i,t , ei,t
{ri,t +Vt+1(hi,t+1)} , (27)
∀t ∈ {0, ...,K−1} .
A time-variant policy pi = {µ0, ...,µK−1} ∈Π, consists in a
sequence of functions µt , where µt : Hi→ Aredi . An action
ai,t is selected from this policy at each time-step t, according
to ai,t = µt(hi,t). We denote as pi t+1 = {µt+1, ...,µK−1} the
sequence of functions µt from time-step t+1 until the end
of the horizon. Standard results from dynamic programming
(DP) show that for the finite time MDP we are addressing
in this paper, there exists at least one such time-variant
policy which is an optimal policy as defined by equation
(22). Therefore, we focus on the computation of such an
optimal time-variant policy. We define the value function
Vt+1 as the optimal expected cumulative rewards from stage
t+1 until the end of the horizon K given by:
Vt+1(hi) =
max
pit+1∈Π
E
(a−i,t+1 ,ei,t+1)
· · ·
(a−i,K−1 ,ei,K−1)
{
K−1
∑
k=t+1
Ri,k
(
hi,k,µk(hi,k),a−i,k
) |hi,t+1 = hi} .
(28)
We observe that Qt(hi,t ,ai,t) is the value attained by taking
action ai,t at state hi,t and subsequently using an optimal pol-
icy. Using the dynamic programming algorithm (Bertsekas,
2005) we have:
Vt(hi,t) = max
ai,t∈Aredi
Qt(hi,t ,ai,t). (29)
Equation (27) can be written in the following form that
relates Qt and Qt+1:
Qt(hi,t ,ai,t) = E
a−i,t , ei,t
{
ri,t + max
ai,t+1∈Aredi
Qt+1(hi,t+1,ai,t+1)
}
.
(30)
An optimal time-variant policy pi∗ =
{
µ∗0 , ...,µ
∗
K−1
}
can be
identified using the Q-functions as following:
µ∗t = argmaxai,t∈Aredi Qt(hi,t ,ai,t), (31)
∀t ∈ {0, ...,K−1} .
Computing the Q-functions from a set of one-step sys-
tem transitions: In order to obtain the optimal time-
variant policy pi∗, the effort is focused on computing the
Q-functions defined in equation (30). However, two aspects
render the use of the standard value iteration algorithm im-
possible for solving the MDP defined in Section 3. First,
the transition probabilities of the MDP defined in Section 3
are not known. Instead, we can exploit the set of collected
historical trajectories to compute the exact Q-functions us-
ing an algorithm such as Q-learning (presented in (Watkins
& Dayan, 1992)). Q-learning is designed for working only
with trajectories, without any knowledge of the transition
probabilities. Optimality is guaranteed given that all state-
action pairs are observed infinitely often within the set of
the historical trajectories and that the successor states are
independently sampled at each occurrence of a state-action
pair (Bertsekas, 2005). In Section 4.6 we discuss the valid-
ity of this condition and we address the problem of limited
exploration by generating additional artificial trajectories.
Second, due to the continuous nature of the state and action
spaces a tabular representation of the Q-functions used in
Q-learning is not feasible. In order to overcome this issue,
we use a function approximation architecture to represent
the Q-functions (Busoniu et al., 2017).
The computation of the approximate Q-functions is per-
formed using the fitted Q iteration algorithm (Ernst et al.,
2005). We present the algorithm for the case where a para-
metric function approximation architecture (Qt(hi,t ,at ;θt))
is used (e.g. neural networks). In this case, the algorithm
is used to compute, recursively, the parameter vectors θt
starting from t = K−1. However, it should be emphasized
that the fitted Q iteration algorithm can be adapted in a
straightforward way to the case in which a non-parametric
function approximation architecture is selected.
The set of M samples of quadruples F ′t ={
(hmi,t ,a
m
i,t ,r
m
t ,h
m
i,t+1),m= 1, ...,M
}
obtained from previous
experience is exploited in order to update the parameter
vectors θt by solving the supervised learning problem
presented in equation (32). The target vectors yt are
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computed using the Q-function approximation of the next
stage (Qt+1(hi,t+1,at+1;θt+1)) according to equation (33).
The Q-function for the terminal state is set to zero (QˆK ≡ 0)
and the algorithm iterates backwards in the time horizon T ,
producing a sequence of approximate Q-functions denoted
by Qˆ= {Qˆ0, ..., QˆK−1} until termination at t = 0.
θt = argmin
θt
M
∑
m=1
(Qt(hmi,t ,a
m
t ;θt)− ymt )2 (32)
ymt = r
m
t + max
ai,t+1∈Aredi
Qt+1(hmi,t+1,ai,t+1;θt+1) (33)
Once the parameters θt are computed, the time-variant pol-
icy pˆi∗ =
{
µˆ∗0 , ..., µˆ
∗
K−1
}
is obtained as:
µˆ∗t (hi,t) = argmaxai,t∈Aredi Qt(hi,t ,ai,t ;θt), (34)
∀t ∈ {0, ...,K−1} .
In practice, a new trajectory is collected after each trading
day. The set of collected trajectories F is consequently
augmented. Thus, the fitted Q iteration algorithm can be
used to compute a new optimal policy when new data arrive.
4.3. Limitations
The fitted Q iteration algorithm, described in the previous
section, can be used to provide a trading policy based on
the set of past trajectories at the disposal of the agent. Even
though, this approach is theoretically sound, in practice
there are several limitations to overcome. The efficiency of
the described fitted Q iteration algorithm is overshadowed
by the high-dimensionality of the state and the action space.
The state variable
hi,t = (si,0,ai,0,ri,0, ...,si,t−1,ai,t−1,ri,t−1,si,t) ∈ Hi
is composed of :
• The entire history of actions (ai,0, ...,ai,t−1) before
time t
• The entire history of rewards (ri,0, ...,ri,t−1) before
time t
• The history of order book states (sOB0 , ...,sOBt )
up to time t and,y of the private information
(sprivatei,0 , ...,s
private
i,t ) up to time t, where:
sprivatei,t =((P
mar
i,t (τ),∆i,t(τ),
Gi,t(τ),Ci,t(τ),SoCi,t(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ ),
wexogi,t ).
The state space Hi as well as the action space Aredi , as de-
scribed in Section 3.2, depend explicitly on the content of
the order book sOBt . The dimension of these spaces at each
time-step t depends on the total number of available orders
| Nt | in the order book. However, the total number of orders
is changing at each step t. Thus, both the state and the action
spaces are high-dimensional spaces of variable size. In order
to reduce the complexity of the decision-making problem,
we have chosen to reduce these spaces so as to work with
a small action space of constant size and a compact state
space. In the following, we describe the procedure that was
carried out for the reduction of the state and action spaces.
4.4. Action space reduction: High-level actions
In this section, we elaborate on the design of a small and
discrete set of actions that is an approximation of the original
action space. Based on Assumptions (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and
(6), a new action space A′i is proposed, which is defined as
A′i = {“Trade”,“Idle”}. The new action space is composed
of two high-level actions a′i,t ∈ A′i. These high-level actions
are transformed to an original action through mapping p :
A′i→ Aredi , from space A′i to the reduced action space Aredi .
The high-level actions are defined as following:
4.4.1. “TRADE”
At each time-step t, agent i selects orders from the order
book with the objective of maximizing the instantaneous
reward under the constraint that the storage device can re-
main balanced for every delivery period, even if no further
interaction with the CID market occurs. As a reminder, this
constraint was imposed by Assumption (5).
Under this assumption, the instantaneous reward signal
ri,t , presented in equation (19), consists only of the trad-
ing revenues obtained from the matching process of or-
ders at time-step t. We will further assume that mapping
u : R+×{“Sell”,“Buy”} → R that adjusts the sign of the
volume vOB of each order according to their side yOB. Orders
posted for buying energy will be associated with positive
volume and orders posted for selling energy with negative
volume, or equivalently:
u(vOB,yOB) =
{
vOB, if yOB = “Buy”,
−vOB, if yOB = “Sell”. (35)
Consequently, the reward function ρ defined in Section 2.4
is adapted according to the proposed modifications. The
new reward function ρ , where ρ : SOB × A¯redi → R, is a
stationary function of the orders observed at each time-
step t and the agent’s response to the observed orders. An
analytical expression for the instantaneous reward collected
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is given by:
ri,t = ρ
(
sOBt , a¯i,t
)
=
Nt
∑
j=1
a ji,t ·u(vOBj ,yOBj ) · pOBj . (36)
The High-level action “Trade” amounts to solving the bid
acceptance optimisation problem presented in Algorithm 1.
The objective function of the problem, formulated in equa-
tion (37), consists of the revenues arising from trading. It
is important to note that the operational constraints guar-
antee that no order will be accepted if it causes any imbal-
ance. We denote as Nτ ⊂ N the set of unique indices of the
available orders that correspond to delivery time-step τ and
Nt =
⋃
τ∈T¯ Nτ . In equation (38), the energy purchased and
sold (∑ j∈Nτ a
j
i,tu(v
OB
j )), the past net energy trades (P
mar
i,t (τ))
and the energy discharged by the storage (Gi,t(τ)) must
match the energy charged by the storage (Ci,t(τ)) for every
delivery time-step τ . The energy balance of the storage
device, presented in equation (39), is responsible for the
time-coupling and the arbitrage between two products x
(delivery time-steps τ). The technical limits of the stor-
age level and the charging and discharging process are de-
scribed in equations (40) to (44). The binary variables
ki,t = (ki,t(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ ) restrict the operation of the unit for
each delivery period in only one mode, either charging or
discharging.
The optimal solution to this problem yields the vector of
fractions:
a¯i,t =
(
a ji,t ,∀ j ∈ Nt
)
∈ A¯redi
that are used in equation (26) to construct the action ai,t ∈
Aredi . The optimal solution also defines at each time-step t
the adjustments in the level of the production (discharge)
∆Gi,t = (∆Gi,t(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ (t)) and the consumption (charge)
∆Ci,t = (∆Ci,t(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ (t)). The evolution of the state
of charge SoCi,t+1 = (SoCi,t+1(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ (t)) of the unit
as well as the production Gi,t+1 = (Gi,t+1(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ (t))
and consumption Ci,t+1 = (Ci,t+1(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ (t)) levels are
computed for each delivery period.
4.4.2. “IDLE”
No transactions are executed, and no adjustment is made to
the previously scheduled quantities. Under this action, the
vector of fractions a¯i,t is a zero vector. The discharge and
charge as well as the state of charge of the storage device
remain unchanged (∆Gi,t ≡ 0 and ∆Ci,t ≡ 0) and we have:
Gi,t+1(τ) = Gi,t(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ (t), (49)
Ci,t+1(τ) =Ci,t(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ (t), (50)
SoCi,t+1(τ) = SoCi,t(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ (t). (51)
With such a reduction of the action-space, the agent can
choose at every time-step t between the two described high-
level actions (a′i,t ∈ A′i = {“Trade”,“Idle”}). Note that
Algorithm 1 “Trade”
Input: t, sOBt , Pmari,t , SoCi, SoCi, Ci, Ci, Gi, Gi, SoCiniti ,
SoCtermi ,τinit , τterm,Gi,t , Ci,t
Output: a¯i,t , SoCi,t+1, Gi,t+1, Ci,t+1, ∆Gi,t , ∆Ci,t , ki,t+1, ri,t
Solve:
max
a¯i,t , SoCi,t+1
Gi,t+1 , Ci,t+1
∆Gi,t , ∆Ci,t
ki,t+1 , ri,t
∑
j∈Nt
a ji,t ·u(vOBj ,yOBj ) · pOBj (37)
s.t. ∑
j∈Nτ
a ji,tu(v
OB
j ,y
OB
j )+P
mar
i,t (τ)+
Ci,t+1(τ) = Gi,t+1(τ), ∀τ ∈ T¯ (t) (38)
SoCi,t+1(τ+∆τ) = SoCi,t+1(τ)+
∆τ ·
(
η ·Ci,t+1(τ)− Gi,t+1(τ)η
)
, ∀τ ∈ T¯ (t) (39)
SoCi ≤ SoCi,t+1(τ)≤ SoCi, ∀τ ∈ T¯ (t) (40)
SoCiniti = SoCi,t+1(τinit), (41)
SoCtermi = SoCi,t+1(τterm), (42)
Ci ≤Ci,t+1(τ)≤ ki,t+1(τ) ·Ci, ∀τ ∈ T¯ (t) (43)
Gi ≤ Gi,t+1(τ)≤ (1− ki,t+1(τ))Gi, ∀τ ∈ T¯ (t) (44)
Gi,t+1(τ) = Gi,t(τ)+∆Gi,t(τ), ∀τ ∈ T¯ (t) (45)
Ci,t+1(τ) =Ci,t(τ)+∆Ci,t(τ), ∀τ ∈ T¯ (t) (46)
ki,t+1(τ) ∈ {0,1} , ∀τ ∈ T¯ (t) (47)
a ji,t ∈ [0,1] , ∀ j ∈ Nt (48)
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when the agent learns to idle, given a current situation, it
does not necessarily mean, that if it had chosen to “Trade”
instead, he would not make a positive immediate reward. In-
deed, the agent would choose “Idle” if it believes that there
may be a better market state emerging, i.e. the agent would
learn to wait for the ideal opportunity of orders appearing in
the order book at subsequent time-steps. We compare this
approach to an alternative, which we refer to as the “rolling
intrinsic” policy. According to this policy, at every time-step
t of the trading horizon the agent selects the combination of
orders that optimises its operation and profits, based on the
current information assuming that the storage device must
remain balanced for every delivery period as presented in
(Lohndorf & Wozabal, 2015). The “rolling intrinsic” pol-
icy is, thus, equivalent to sequentially selecting the action
“Trade” (Algorithm 1), as defined in this framework. The
algorithm proposed later in this paper exploits the experi-
ence that the agent can gain through (artificial) interaction
with its environment, in order to learn the value of trading
or idling at every different state that agent may encounter.
4.5. State space reduction
In this section, we propose a more compact and low-
dimensional representation of the state space Hi. The state
hi,t , as explained in Section 4.3, contains the entire history
of all the relevant information available for the decision-
making up to time t. We consider each one of the compo-
nents of the state hi,t , namely the entire history of actions,
order book states and private information, and we provide a
simplified form.
First, the vector containing the entire history of actions is re-
duced to a vector of binary variables after the modifications
introduced in Section 4.4.
Second, the vector containing the history of order
book states is reduced into a vector of engineered fea-
tures. We start from the order book state sOBt =
((xOBj ,y
′OB
j ,v
OB
j , p
OB
j ,e
OB
j ),∀ j ∈ Nt ⊆ N) ∈ SOB that is de-
fined in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 as a high-dimensional contin-
uous vector used to describe the state of the CID market.
Owing to the variable (non-constant) and large amount of
orders |Nt |, the space SOB has a non-constant size with
high-dimensionality.
In order to overcome this issue, we proceed as following.
First, we consider the market depth curves for each product
x. The market depth of each side (“Sell” or “Buy”) at a
time-step t, is defined as the total volume available in the
order book per price level for product x. The market depth
for the “Sell” (“Buy”) side is computed by stacking the
existing orders in ascending (descending) price order and
accumulating the available volume. The market depth for
each of the quarter-hourly products Q1 to Q6 at time instant
t is illustrated in Figure 2a using data from the German CID
market. The market depth curves serve as a visualization of
the order book that provides information about the liquidity
of the market. Moreover, it provides information about the
maximum (minimum) price that a trading agent will have to
pay in order to buy (sell) a certain volume of energy. If we
assume a fixed-price discretisation, certain upper and lower
bounds on the prices and interpolation of the data in this
price range, the market depth curves of each product x can
be approximated by a finite and constant set of values.
Even though this set of values has a constant size, it can
still be extremely large. Its dimension is not a function of
the number of existing orders any more, but it depends on
the resolution of the price discretisation, the price range
considered, and the total number of products in the market.
Instead of an individual market depth curve for each product
x, we consider a market depth curve for all the available
products, i.e. existing orders in ascending (descending)
price order and accumulating the available volumes for all
the products. In this way we can construct the aggregated
market depth curve, presented in Figure 2b. The aggregated
market depth curve illustrates the total available volume
(“Sell” or “Buy”) per price level for all products.
The motivation for considering the aggregated curves comes
from the very nature of a storage device. The main profit-
generating mechanism of a storage device is the arbitrage
between two delivery periods. Its functionality involves the
purchasing (charging) of electricity during periods of low
prices and the selling (discharging) during periods of high
prices.
For instance, in Figure 2a, a storage device would buy vol-
ume for product Q4 and sell volume back for product Q5.
The intersection of the “Sell” and “Buy” curves in Figure 2b
defines the maximum volume that can be arbitraged by the
storage device if no operational constraints were considered
and serves as an upper bound for the profits at each step
t. Alternatively, the market depth for the same products
Q1 to Q6 at a different time-step of the trading horizon is
presented in Figure 3a. As illustrated in Figure 3b, there is
no arbitrage opportunity between the products, hence the
aggregated curves do not intersect. Thus, we assume, that
the aggregated curves provide a sufficient representation of
the order book.
At this point, considering a fixed-price discretisation and a
fixed price range would yield a constant set of values able
to describe the aggregated curves. However, in order to
further decrease the size of the set of values with sufficient
price discretisation, we motivate the use of a set of distance
measures between the two aggregated curves that succeed
in capturing the arbitrage potential at each trading time-step
t as state variables, as presented in Figures 2b and 3b.
For instance, we define as D1 the signed distance between
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2. (a) Market depth per product (for products Q1 to Q6)
at a time-step t with arbitrage potential. (b) The corresponding
aggregated curves for a profitable order book.
the 75th percentile of “Buy” price and the 25th percentile
of “Sell” price and as D2 the absolute distance between the
mean value of “Buy” and “Sell” volumes. Other measures
used are the signed price difference and absolute volume
difference between percentiles (25%, 50%, 75%) and the
bid-ask spread. A detailed list of the distance measures is
provided in Table 2.
The new, continuous, low-dimensional observation of the
order book s′OBt ∈ S′OB = {D1, ..,D10} is used to represent
the state of the order book and, in particular, its profit poten-
tial. It is important to note that in contrast to sOBt ∈ SOB, the
new order book observation s′OBt ∈ S′OB does not depend on
the number of orders in the order book and therefore has
a constant size, i.e. the cardinality of S′OB is constant over
time.
Finally, the history of the private information of agent i,
that is not publicly available, is a vector that contains the
high-dimensional continuous variables sprivatei,t related to the
operation of the storage device. As described in Section 4.3,
sprivatei,t is defined as:
sprivatei,t =((P
mar
i,t (τ),∆i,t(τ),
Gi,t(τ),Ci,t(τ),SoCi,t(τ),∀τ ∈ T¯ ),
wexogi,t ).
(a)
(b)
Figure 3. (a) Market depth per product (for products Q1 to Q6) at
a time-step t with no arbitrage potential. (b) The corresponding
aggregated curves for a non profitable order book.
According to Assumption (5), the trading agent cannot per-
form any transaction if it results in imbalances. Therefore, it
is not relevant to consider the vector ∆i,t since it will always
be zero according to the way the high-level actions are de-
fined in Section 4.4. Additionally, Assumption (3) regarding
the default strategy for storage control in combination with
Assumption (5) yields a direct correlation between vectors
Pmari,t and Gi,t , Ci,t , SoCi,t . Thus, it is considered that P
mar
i,t
contains all the required information and thus vectors Gi,t ,
Ci,t and SoCi,t can be dropped.
Following the previous analysis we can de-
fine the low-dimensional pseudo-state zi,t =
(s′i,0,a
′
i,0,ri,0, ...,a
′
i,t−1,ri,t−1,s
′
i,t) ∈ Zi, where
s′i,t = (s′OBt ,Pmari,t ,w
exog
i,t ) ∈ S′i. This pseudo-state can
be seen as the result of applying an encoder e : Hi → Zi
which maps a true state hi,t to pseudo-state zi,t .
Assumption 7 (Pseudo-state). The pseudo-state zi,t ∈ Zi con-
tains all the relevant information for the optimisation of the
CID market trading of an asset-optimizing agent.
Under Assumption (7), using the pseudo-state zi,t instead
of the true state hi,t is equivalent and does not lead to a
sub-optimal policy. The resulting decision process after the
state and action spaces reductions is illustrated in Figure 4.
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a−i,t ri,t a−i,t+1 ri,t+1
· · · hi,t CID Env Storage hi,t+1 CID Env Storage · · ·
e ai,t e ai,t+1
zi,t p zi,t+1 p
pii a′i,t pii a′i,t+1
strategy
“default”
strategy
“default”
Figure 4. Schematic of the decision process. The original MDP is highlighted in a gray background. The state of the original MDP hi,t is
encoded in pseudo-state zi,t . Based on zi,t , agent i takes an high-level action a′i,t , according to its policy pii. This action a′i,t is mapped to an
original action ai,t and submitted to the CID market. The CID market makes a transition based on the action of agent i and the actions of
the other agents a−i,t . After this transition, the market position of agent i is defined and the control actions for storage device are derived
according to the “default” strategy. Each transition yields a reward ri,t and a new state hi,t .
Output QTrade QIdle
FC5 shape: (batch size, 36, 2) F F · · · F
Fully Connected
...
...
...
FC2 shape: (batch size, 36, 36) F F · · · F
FC1 shape: (batch size, 128, 36) F F · · · F
Hidden state hi,0 hi,1 · · · hi,t
LSTM hi,−1 LSTM LSTM · · · LSTM
Inputs s¯i,t−h¯ s¯i,t−h¯+1 · · · s¯i,t
Input shape: (batch size, h¯, 263)
Lstm output: (batch size, 128)
Figure 5. Schematic of the neural network architecture.
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Table 2. Order book features used for the state reduction.
Symbol Definition Description
D1 pBuymax− pSellmin Signed diff. between the maximum “Buy” price and the minimum “Sell” price
D2 pBuymean− pSellmean Signed diff. between the mean “Buy” price and the mean “Sell” price
D3 pBuy25%− pSell75% Signed diff. between the 25th percentile “Buy” price and the 75th percentile “Sell” price
D4 pBuy50%− pSell50% Signed diff. between the 50th percentile “Buy” price and the 50th percentile “Sell” price
D5 pBuy75%− pSell25% Signed diff. between the 75th percentile “Buy” price and the 25th percentile “Sell” price
D6 |vBuymin− vSellmin | Abs. diff. between the minimum “Buy” cum. volume and the maximum “Sell” cum. volume
D7 |vBuymean− vSellmean| Abs. diff. between the mean “Buy” cum. volume and the mean “Sell” cum. volume
D8 |vBuy25%− vSell25%| Abs. diff. between the 25th percentile “Buy” cum. volume and the 25th percentile “Sell” cum. volume
D9 |vBuy50%− vSell50%| Abs. diff. between the 50th percentile “Buy” cum. volume and the 50th percentile “Sell” cum. volume
D10 |vBuy75%− vSell75%| Abs. diff. between the 75th percentile “Buy” cum. volume and the 75th percentile “Sell” cum. volume
4.6. Generation of artificial trajectories
In this section, the generation of additional artificial trajec-
tories for addressing exploration issues is discussed. Indeed,
if we were to implement an agent that selects at every time-
step among the “Idle” and “Trade” actions, we would collect
a certain number of trajectories (one per day) over a cer-
tain period of interactions. The collected dataset could be
used to train a policy using a batch mode RL algorithm,
as described in Section 4.2. Every time a new trajectory
would arrive, it would be appended in the previous set of
trajectories and the entire dataset could be used to improve
the trading policy.
This approach requires a large number of days in order to
acquire a sufficient amount of data. Additionally, as dis-
cussed in Section 4.2, sufficient exploration of the state and
action spaces is a key requirement for converging to a near-
optimal policy. It is required that all parts of the state and
action spaces are visited sufficiently often. As a result, the
RL agent needs to explore unknown grounds in order to
discover interesting policies (exploration). It should also ap-
ply these learned policies to get high rewards (exploitation).
However, since the set of collected trajectories would come
from a real agent, the visitation of many different states is
expected to be limited.
In the RL context, exploration is performed when the agent
selects a different action than the one that, according to its
experience, will yield the highest rewards. In real life, it
is unlikely for a trader to select such actions, and poten-
tially bear negative revenues, for the sake of gaining more
experience. This leads to limited exploration of the learning
process and would result in a suboptimal policy.
Assumption 8 (No impact on the behaviour of the rest of the
agents). The actions of trading agent i do not influence the
future actions of the rest of the agents −i in the CID market.
In this way, agent i is not capable of influencing the market.
Assumption (8) implies that each of the agents−i entering in
the market would post orders solely based on their individual
needs. Furthermore, its actions are not considered as a
reaction to the actions of the other market players.
Leveraging Assumption (8) allows one to tackle the ex-
ploration issues discussed previously by generating several
artificial trajectories using historical order book data. We
denote by E the number of episodes (times) each day from
historical data is repeated and by Ltrain the set of trading
days used to train the agent. We can then obtain the total
number of trajectories M as M = E · |Ltrain|.
The generation of artificial trajectories is performed accord-
ing to the process described in (Ernst et al., 2005). This
process interleaves the generation of trajectories with the
computation of an approximate Q-function using the trajec-
tories already generated. As shown in Algorithm 2, for a
number of episodes ep, we randomly select days from the
training set which we simulate using an ε-greedy policy.
According to this policy, an action is chosen at random with
probability ε and according to the available Q-functions
with probability (1− ε). The generated trajectories are
added to the set of trajectories. The second step consists
of updating the Q-function approximation using the set of
collected trajectories. This process is terminated when the
total number of episodes has reached the specified number
E.
This process introduces parameters Ltrain, E, ep, ε and
decay. The selection of these parameters impacts the train-
ing progress and the quality of the resulting policy. The set
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Algorithm 2 Generation of artificial trajectories
Input: Ltrain, E, ep, ε , decay
Output: Qˆ, F
Initialize Qˆ≡ 0
M← E · |Ltrain|
m← 0
repeat
for iter j← 0 to ep do
d← rand(Ltrain) B Randomly pick a day d from train set Ltrain
ζm← simulate(d,ε−greedy(Qˆ)) B Generate trajectory ζm by simulating day d using ε-greedy policy
F.add(ζm) B Append trajectory from day d to set F
ε ← anneal(ε,decay, iteri) B Anneal the value of ε based on decay parameter
m← m+1
Update Qˆ using set F according to equations (32), (33) B Fit new Qˆ functions
until m≥M;
return Qˆ,F
of days considered for training (Ltrain) is typically selected
as a proportion (e.g. 70%) of the total set of days available.
The total number of episodes E should be large enough so
that convergence is achieved and is typically tuned based
on the application. The frequency with which the trajectory
generation and the updates are interleaved is controlled by
parameter ep. A small number of ep results in a large num-
ber of updates. Parameter ε is used to address the trade-off
between exploration-exploitation during the training pro-
cess. As the training evolves, this parameter is annealed
based on some predefined parameter decay, in order to grad-
ually reduce exploration and to favour exploration along
the (near-)optimal trajectories. In practice, the size of the
buffer F cannot grow infinitely due to memory limitations,
so typically a limit on the number of trajectories stored in
the buffer is imposed. Once this limit is reached, the oldest
trajectories are removed as new ones arrive. The buffer is a
double-ended queue of fixed size.
4.7. Neural Network architecture
As described in Section 4.5, pseudo-state zi,t contains a
sequence of variables whose length is proportional to t. This
motivates the use of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs),
that are known for being able to efficiently process variable-
length sequences of inputs. In particular, we use Long Short-
term Memory (LSTM) networks (Goodfellow et al., 2016),
a type of RNNs where a gating mechanism is introduced to
regulate the flow of information to the memory state.
All the networks in this study have the architecture pre-
sented in Figure 5. It is composed of one LSTM layer with
128 neurons followed by five fully connected layers with
36 neurons where “ReLU” was selected as the activation
function. The structure of the network (number of layers
and neurons) was selected after cross-validation.
Theoretically, the length of the sequence of features that
is provided as input to the neural network can be as large
as the total number of trading steps in the optimisation
horizon. In practice though, there are limitations with
respect to the memory that is required to store a tensor of
this size. As we can observe in Figure 5, each sample in
the batch contains a vector of size 263 for each time-step.
Assuming a certain batch size, there is a certain limit to
the number of steps that can be stored in the memory.
Therefore, for practical reasons and due to hardware
limitations, we assume a history length h¯ defined as zi,t =
(a′i,t−h¯−1,ri,t−h¯−1,s
′
i,t−h¯,a
′
i,t−h¯,ri,t−h¯, ...,a
′
i,t−1,ri,t−1,s
′
i,t) ∈
Zi. At each step t, the history length h¯ takes the
minimum value between the time-step t and h¯max,
(h¯ = min(t, h¯max)). Additionally, we provide the variable
s¯t = (a′i,t−1,ri,t−1,s
′
i,t), as a fixed size input for each step t
of the LSTM. Consequently, the pseudo-state can be written
as zi,t = (s¯t−h¯, ..., s¯t).
4.8. Asynchronous Distributed Fitted Q iteration
The exploration requirements of the continuous state space,
as defined previously introduce the necessity for collecting
a large number of trajectories M. The total time required for
gathering these trajectories heavily depends on the simula-
tion time needed for one episode. In this particular setting
developed, the simulation time can be quite long since, at
each decision step, if the action selected is “Trade”, an
optimisation model is constructed and solved.
In this paper and in order to address this issue, we resort to
an asynchronous architecture, similar to the one proposed
in (Horgan et al., 2018), presented in Figure 6. The two
processes, described in Section 4.6, namely generation of
trajectories and computation of the Q-functions, run concur-
rently with no high-level synchronization.
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Network
Actor
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Environment
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Figure 6. Schematic of the asynchronous distributed architecture. Each actor runs on a different thread and contains a copy of the
environment, an individual ε-greedy policy based on the latest version of the network parameters and a local buffer. The actors generate
trajectories that are stored in their local buffers. When the local buffer of each actor is filled, it is appended to the global buffer and the
agent collects the latest network parameters from the learner. A single learner runs on a separate thread and is continuously training using
experiences from the global buffer.
Multiple actors that run on different threads are used to
generate trajectories. Each actor contains a copy of the
environment, an individual ε-greedy policy based on the
latest version of the Q functions and a local buffer. The
actors use their ε-greedy policy to perform transitions in
the environment. The transitions are stored in the local
buffer. When the local buffer of each actor is filled, it is
appended to the global buffer, the agent collects the latest
Q-functions from the learner and continues the simulation.
A single learner continuously updates the Q-functions using
the simulated trajectories from a global buffer.
The benefits from asynchronous methods in Deep Reinforce-
ment Learning (DRL) are elaborated in (Mnih et al., 2016).
Each actor can use a different exploration policy (different
initial ε value and decay) in order to enhance diversity in the
collected samples which leads to a more stable learning pro-
cess. Additionally, it is shown that the total computational
time scales linearly with the number of threads considered.
Another major advantage is that distributed techniques were
shown to have a super-linear speedup for one-step methods
that are not only related to computational gains. It is argued
that, the positive effect of having multiple threads leads to
a reduction of the bias in one-step methods (Mnih et al.,
2016). In this way, these algorithms are shown to be much
more data efficient than the original versions.
5. Case study
The proposed methodology is applied for the case of a PHES
unit. First, the parameters and the exogenous information
used for the optimisation of the CID market participation
of a PHES operator are described. Second, the benchmark
strategy used for comparison purposes and the process that
was carried out for validation are presented. Finally, per-
formance results of the obtained policy are presented and
discussed.
5.1. Parameters specification
The proposed methodology is applied for a PHES unit par-
ticipating in the German CID market with the following
characteristics:
• SoCi = 200 MWh,
• SoCi = 0 MWh,
• SoCiniti = SoCtermi =
(
SoCi−SoCi
)
/2,
• Ci = Gi = 200 MW,
• Ci = Gi = 0 MW,
• η = 100%.
The discrete trading horizon has been selected to be ten
hours, i.e. T = {17 : 00, ...,03 : 00}. The trading time in-
terval is selected to be ∆t = 15 min. Thus the trading pro-
cess takes K = 40 steps until termination. Moreover, all
96 quarter-hourly products of the day, X = {Q1, ..,Q96},
are considered. Consequently, the delivery timeline is T¯ =
{00 : 00, ...,23 : 45}, with τinit = 00 : 00 and τterm = 24 : 00
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and the delivery time interval is ∆τ = 15 min. Each product
can be traded until 30 minutes before the physical delivery
of electricity begins (e.g. tclose(Q1) = 23 : 30 etc.).
The number of days selected for training was |Ltrain| =
252 days. For the construction of the training/test sets, the
days were sampled uniformly without replacement from a
pool of 362 days. The number of simulated episodes for
each training day was selected to be E = 2000 episodes for
the artificial trajectories generation process, described in
Section 4.6. During the trajectories generation process the
high-level actions (“Trade” or “Idle”) were chosen following
an ε-greedy policy. As described in Section 4.8, each of
the actor threads is provided with a different exploration
parameter ε that is initialised with a random uniform sample
in the range [0.1,0.5]. The parameter ε is then annealed
exponentially until a zero value is reached.
The pseudo-state zi,t = (s′i,0,a
′
i,0,ri,0, ...,a
′
i,t−1,ri,t−1,s
′
i,t) ∈
Zi is composed of the entire history of observations and
actions up to time-step t, as described in Section 4.5. For
the sake of memory requirements, as explained in Section
4.7, we assume that the last ten trading steps contain suffi-
cient information about the past. Thus, the pseudo-state is
transformed in sequences of fixed length h¯max = 10,
5.2. Exogenous variable
The exogenous variable wexogi,t represents any relevant infor-
mation available to agent i about the system. In this case
study, we assumed that the variable wexogi,t contains:
• The 24 values of the Day-ahead price for the entire
trading day
• The Imbalance price and the system Imbalance for the
four quarters preceding each time-step t
• Time features: i) the hour of the day, ii) the month and
iii) whether the traded day is a weekday or weekend
5.3. Benchmark strategy
The strategy selected for comparison purposes is the “rolling
intrinsic” policy, denoted by piRI (Lohndorf & Wozabal,
2015). According to this policy, the agent selects at each
trading time-step t the action “Trade”, as described in Sec-
tion 4.4. This benchmark is selected since it represents the
current state of the art used in the industry for the optimisa-
tion of PHES unit market participation.
5.4. Validation process
The performance of the policy obtained using the fitted Q
algorithm, denoted by piFQ, is evaluated on test set Ltest that
contains historical data from 110 days. These days are not
used during the training process. This process of backtesting
a strategy on historical data is widely used because it can
provide a measure of how successful a strategy would be
if it had been executed in the past. However, there is no
guarantee that this performance can be expected in the future.
This validation process heavily relies on Assumption (8)
about the inability of the agent to influence the behaviour
of the other players in the market. It can still provide an
approximation on the results of the obtained policy before
deploying it in real life. However, the only way to evaluate
the exact viability of a strategy is to deploy it in real life.
We compare the performances of the policy obtained by the
fitted Q iteration algorithm piFQ and the “rolling intrinsic”
policy piRI . The comparison will always be based on the
computation of the return of the policies on each day. For
a given policy, the return over a day will be simply com-
puted by running the policy on the day and summing up the
rewards obtained.
The learning algorithm that we have designed for learning a
policy has two sources of variance, namely those related to
the generation of the new trajectories and those related to
the learning of the Q-functions from the set of trajectories.
To evaluate the performance of our learning algorithm we
will perform several runs and average the performances of
the policies learned. In the following, when we report the
performance of a fitted Q iteration policy over one day, we
will actually report the average performances of ten learned
policies over this day.
We now describe the different indicators that will be used
afterwards to assess the performances of our method. These
indicators will be computed for both the training set and the
test set, but are detailed hereafter when they are computed
for the test set. It is straightforward to adapt the procedure
for computing the indicators for the training set.
Let V pi
FQ
d and V
piRI
d denote the total return of the fitted Q
and the “rolling intrinsic” policy for day d, respectively.
We gather the obtained returns of each policy for each day
d ∈ Ltest . We sort the returns in ascending order, and we
obtain an ordered set containing a number of |Ltest | values
for each policy. We provide descriptive statistics about the
distribution of the returns of each policy V pi
FQ
d and V
piRI
d on
the test set Ltest . In particular, we report the mean, the mini-
mum and maximum values achieved for the set considered.
Moreover, we provide the values obtained for each of the
quartiles (25%, 50% and 75%) of the set.
Additionally, we compute the sum of returns over the entire
set of days as follows:
V pi
FQ
= ∑
d∈Ltest
V pi
FQ
d , (52)
V pi
RI
= ∑
d∈Ltest
V pi
RI
d . (53)
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An alternative performance indicator considered is the dis-
crepancy of the returns coming from the fitted Q policy with
respect to the risk-averse rolling intrinsic policy. We define
the profitability ratio rd for each day d ∈ Ltest , that corre-
sponds to the signed percentage difference between the two
policies as follows:
rd =
V pi
FQ
d −V pi
RI
d
V piRId
·100%. (54)
In a similar fashion, we sort the profitability ratios obtained
for each day in the test set and we provide descriptive statis-
tics about its distribution across the set. The mean, minimum
and maximum values of the profitability ratio as well as the
values of each quartile are reported. Finally, we compute
the profitability ratio for the sum of returns over the entire
set between the two policies, as:
rsum =
V pi
FQ −V piRI
V piRI
·100%. (55)
5.5. Results
The performance indicators described previously are com-
puted for both the training and the test set. The results
obtained are summarised in Tables 3 and 4. Descriptive
statistics about the distribution of the returns from both poli-
cies as well as the profitability ratio are presented for each
dataset.
It can be observed that on average piFQ yields better returns
than piRI both on the training and the test set. More specifi-
cally, on the training set, the obtained policy performs, on
average 2.56% better than the “rolling intrinsic” policy. For
the top 25% of the training days the profitability ratio is
higher than 3.69% and in some cases it even exceeds 10%.
Overall, the total profits coming from the fitted Q policy
add up to e2,167,624, yielding a difference of e57,423.3
(2.7%) more than the profits from the “rolling intrinsic” for
the set of 252 days considered.
The fitted Q policy yields on average a 1.5% greater profit on
the test set with respect to the returns of the “rolling intrinsic”
policy. It is important to highlight that for 50% of the test
set, the profits from the fitted Q policy are higher than 1%
in comparison to the “rolling intrinsic”. The difference
between the total profits resulting from the two policies over
the set of 110 days considered amounts to e15,681 (1.7%).
The distribution of training and test set samples according
to the obtained profitability ratio is presented in Figure 7. It
can be observed that most samples are spread in the interval
between 0−5% and that the distribution has a positive skew.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the returns obtained on the days
of the training set for policies piFQ and piRI . The last column also
provides the corresponding profitability ratios.
piFQ returns (e) piRI returns (e) r (%)
mean 8670 8440 2.56
min 2586 2524 −0.42
25% 5571 5537 0.33
50% 7496 7385 1.45
75% 11081 10632 3.69
max 54967 54285 23.12
sum 2167624 2110200 2.7
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the returns obtained on the days
of the test set for policies piFQ and piRI . The last column also
provides the corresponding profitability ratios.
piFQ returns (e) piRI returns (e) r (%)
mean 8583 8439 1.50
min 2391 2366 −0.73
25% 5600 5527 0.23
50% 7661 7622 0.87
75% 10823 10721 2.22
max 37902 36490 6.56
sum 935552 919871 1.7
It is important to note that, for the vast majority of the
samples, the profitability ratio is nonnegative. This result
allows us to characterize the new policy as risk-free in the
sense that in the worst case, the fitted Q policy performs as
well as the “rolling intrinsic” policy. From the standpoint of
practical implementation this result allows us to construct
a wrapper around the current industrial standard practices
and expect an average improved performance of 2% almost
without any risk. However, as discussed earlier, the back-
testing of a strategy in historical data may differ from the
outcomes in real deployment for various reasons.
6. Discussion
In this section, we provide some remarks related to the
practical challenges encountered and the validity of the
assumptions considered throughout this paper.
6.1. Behaviour of the rest of the agents
In this paper, we assumed (Assumption 1) that the rest of
the agents −i post orders in the market based on their needs
and some historical information of the state of the order
book. In reality, the available information that the other
agents possess is not accessible by agent i. This fact gives
rise to issues related to the validity of the assumption that
the process is Markovian.
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Figure 7. Profitability ratio.
We further assumed (8) in Section 4.6 that the behaviour of
agent i does not influence the strategy of the other agents
−i. Based on this assumption the training and the validation
process were performed using historical data. However,
the strategy of each of the market participants is highly
dependent on the actions of the rest participants, especially
in a market with limited liquidity such as the CID market.
These assumptions, although slightly unrealistic and opti-
mistic, provide us with a meaningful testing protocol for a
trading strategy. The actual profitability of a strategy can be
obtained by deploying the strategy in real-time. However,
it is important to show that the strategy is able to obtain
substantial profits in back-testing first.
6.2. Partial observability of the process
In Section 3, the decision-making problem studied in this
paper was framed as an MDP after considering certain as-
sumptions. Theoretically, this formulation is very conve-
nient, but does not hold in practice. Especially considering
Assumption 7, where the reduced pseudo-state is assumed
to contain all the relevant information required.
Indeed, the trading agents do not have access to all the
information required. For instance, a real agent does not
know how many other agents are active in the market. They
do not know the strategy of each agent either. There is
also a lot of information gathered by wexog which is not
available for the agent. Finally, the fact that the state space
was reduced results in an inevitable loss of information.
Therefore, it would be more accurate to consider a Partially
Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) instead. In
a POMDP, the real state is hidden and the agent only has ac-
cess to observations. For an RL algorithm to properly work
with a POMDP, the observations have to be representative
of the real hidden states.
6.3. Exploration
There are two main issues related to the state space explo-
ration that result in the somewhat limited performance of
the obtained policy. First, in the described setting, the way
in which we generate the artificial trajectories is very im-
portant for the success of the method. The generated states
must be “representative” in the sense that the areas around
these states are visited often under a near optimal policy
(Bertsekas, 2005). In particular, the frequency of appear-
ance of these areas of states in the training process should
be proportional to the probability of occurrence under the
optimal policy. However, in practice, we are not in a posi-
tion to know which areas are visited by the optimal policy.
In that respect, the asynchronous distributed algorithm used
in this paper was found to successfully address the issue of
state exploration.
Second, the assumptions (Assumptions 3, 4, 5) related to
the operation of the storage device according to the “default”
strategy without any imbalances allowed, as well as the par-
ticipation of the agent as an aggressor, are restrictive with
respect to the set of all admissible policies. Additionally,
the adoption of the reduced discrete action space described
in Section 4.4 introduces further restrictions on the set of
available actions. Although having a small and discrete
space is convenient for the optimisation process, it leads
to limited state exploration. For instance, the evolution of
the state of charge of the storage device is always given
as the output of the optimisation model based on the order
book data. Thus, in this configuration, it is not possible
to explore all areas of the state space (storage levels) but
only a certain area driven by the historical order book data.
However, evaluating the policy on a different dataset might
lead to areas of the state space (e.g. storage level) that are
never visited during training, leading to poor performance.
Potential mitigations of this issue involve diverse data aug-
mentation techniques and/or different representation of the
action space.
7. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, a novel RL framework for the participation
of a storage device operator in the CID market is proposed.
The energy exchanges between market participants occur
through a centralized order book. A series of assumptions
related to the behaviour of the market agents and the oper-
ation of the storage device are considered. Based on these
assumptions, the sequential decision-making problem is cast
as an MDP. The high dimensionality of both the action and
the state spaces increase the computational complexity of
finding a policy. Thus, we motivate the use of discrete high-
level actions that map into the original action space. We
further propose a more compact state representation. The
resulting decision process is solved using fitted Q iteration,
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a batch mode reinforcement learning algorithm. The results
illustrate that the obtained policy is a low-risk policy that
is able to outperform on average the state of the art for the
industry benchmark strategy (“rolling intrinsic”) by 1.5%
on the test set. The proposed method can serve as a wrapper
around the current industrial practices that provides decision
support to energy trading activities with low risk.
The main limitations of the developed strategy originate
from: i) the insufficient amount of relevant information
contained in the state variable, either because the state re-
duction proposed leads to a loss of information or due to the
unavailability of information and ii) the limited state space
exploration as a result of the proposed high-level actions in
combination with the use of historical data. To this end and
as future work, a more detailed and accurate representation
of the state should be devised. This can be accomplished by
increasing the amount of information considered, such as
RES forecasts, and by improving the order book representa-
tion. We propose the use of continuous high-level actions
in an effort to gain state exploration without leading to very
complex and high-dimensional action space.
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A. Nomenclature
Acronyms
ADP Approximate Dynamic Programming.
CID Continuous Intraday.
DRL Deep Reinforcement Learning.
FCFS First Come First Served.
MDP Markov Decision Process.
OB Order Book.
PHES Pumped Hydro Energy Storage.
RES Renewable Energy Sources.
Sets and indexes
Name Description
i Index of an agent.
−i Index of all the agents except agent i.
j Index of an order.
m Index of a sample of quadruples.
d Index of a day in a set.
t Trading time-step.
τ Discrete time-step of delivery.
A Joint action space for all the agents.
Ai Action space of agent i.
A−i Action space of the rest of the agents −i.
Aredi Reduced action space of agent i.
A′i Set of high-level actions for agent i.
A¯i Set of all factors for the partial/full acceptance
of orders by agent i.
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E Set of conditions that can apply to an order.
F Set of all sampled trajectories.
F ′ Set of sampled one-step transitions.
F ′t Set of sampled one-step transitions for time t.
Hi Set of all histories for agent i.
I Set of agents.
Ltrain Set of trading days used to train the agent.
Ltest Set of trading days used to evaluate the agent.
Nt Set of all available order unique indexes at time
t.
N′t Set of all the unique indexes of new orders
posted at time t.
Nτ Set of all the unique indexes of orders for deliv-
ery at τ .
Ot Set of all available orders in the order book at
time t.
SOB Set of all available orders in the order book.
S′OB Low dimensional set of all available orders in
the order book.
Si State space of agent i.
T Trading horizon, i.e. time interval between first
possible trade and last possible trade.
T (x) Discretization of the trading timeline for product
x.
T¯ Discretization of the delivery timeline.
T¯ (t) Discretization of the delivery timeline at trading
step t.
T Imb Discretization of the imbalance settlement time-
line.
X Set of all available products.
Xt Set of all available products at time t.
Zi Set of pseudo-states for agent i.
Π Set of all admissible policies.
Parameters
Name Description
Ci Maximum consumption level for the asset of
agent i.
Ci Minimum consumption level for the asset of
agent i.
E Number of episodes.
e Conditions applying on an order other than vol-
ume and price.
ep Number of simulations between two successive
Q function updates.
decay Parameter for the annealing of ε .
Gi Maximum production level for the asset of agent
i.
Gi Minimum production level for the asset of agent
i.
h¯ Sequence length of past information.
h¯max Maximum sequence length of past information.
I(τ) Imbalance price for delivery period δ (x).
K Number of steps in the trading period.
M Number of samples of quadruples.
n Number of agents.
ot Market order.
p Price of an order.
pmax Maximum price of an order.
pmin Minimum price of an order.
SoCi Maximum state of charge of storage device.
SoCi Minimum state of charge of storage device.
SoCiniti State of charge of storage device at the begin-
ning of the delivery timeline.
SoCtermi State of charge of storage device at the end of
the delivery timeline.
tclose(x) End of trading period for product x.
tdelivery(x) Start of delivery of product x.
topen(x) Start of trading period for product x.
tsettle(x) Time of settlement for product x.
v Volume of an order.
x Market product.
y Side of an order (“Sell” or “Buy”).
ymt Target computed for sample m at time t.
δ (x) Time interval covered by product x (delivery).
∆t Time interval between trading time-steps.
∆τ Time interval between delivery time-steps.
ε Parameter for the ε-greedy policy.
η Charging/discharging efficiency of storage de-
vice.
θt Parameters vector of function approximation at
time t.
λ (x) Duration of time-interval δ (x).
ζ A single trajectory.
ζm A single indexed trajectory.
τinit Initial time-step of the delivery timeline.
τterm Terminal time-step of the delivery timeline.
Variables
Name Description
at Joint action from all the agents at time t.
ai,t Action of posting orders by agent i at time t.
a−i,t Action of posting orders by the rest of the agents
−i at time t.
a′i,t High-level action by agent i at time t.
a ji,t Acceptance (partial/full) factor for order j by
agent i at time t.
a¯i,t Factors for the partial/full acceptance of all or-
ders by agent i at time t.
Ci,t(τ) Consumption level at delivery time-step τ com-
puted at time t.
ci,t(t ′) Consumption level during the delivery interval.
ei,t Random disturbance for agent i at time t.
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Gi,t(τ) Generation level at delivery time-step τ com-
puted at t.
gi,t(t ′) Generation level during the delivery interval.
hi,t History vector of agent i at time t.
ki,t(τ) Binary variable that enforces either charging or
discharging of the storage device.
Pmari,t (x) Net contracted power of agent i for product x
(delivery time-step τ) at time t.
Presi,t (τ) Residual production of agent i delivery time-
step τ (for product x) at time t.
Presi (τ) Final residual production of agent i for product
ri,t Instantaneous reward of agent i at time t.
rd Profitability ratio at day d.
rsum Profitability ratio for the sum of returns over set.
si,t State of agent i at time t.
SoCi,t(τ) State of charge of device at delivery time-step τ
computed at t.
sOBt State of the order book at time t.
s′OBt Low dimensional state of the order book at time
t.
sprivatei,t Private information of agent i at time t.
s¯t Triplet of fixed size, part of pseudo-state zi,t that
serves as an input at LSTM at time t.
ui,t Aggregate (trading and asset) control action of
the asset trading agent i at time t.
vconi,t (x) Volume of product x contracted by agent i at
time t.
wexogi,t Exogenous information of agent i at time t.
zi,t Pseudo-state for agent i at time t.
∆i,t(τ) Imbalance for delivery time τ for agent i com-
puted at time t.
∆i(τ) Final imbalance for delivery time τ for agent i.
∆Gi,t Change in the production level for the asset of
agent i at time t.
∆Ci,t : Change in the consumption level for the asset
of agent i at time t.
Functions
Name Description
clear(·) Market clearing function.
b(·) Univariate stochastic model for exogenous in-
formation.
e(·) Encoder that maps from the original state space
Hi to pseudo-state space Zi.
f (·) Order book transition function.
Gζ (·) Revenue collected over a trajectory.
g(·) System dynamics of the MDP.
k(·) System dynamics of asset trading process.
l(·) Reduced action space construction function.
Pa−i,t (·) Probability distribution function for the actions
of the rest of the agents −i.
Pet (·) Random disturbance probability distribution
function.
P(·) Transition probabilities of the MDP.
PFQ(·) The stochastic process (algorithm) of fitted Q
iteration.
Pθt,0(·) Distribution of the initial parameters θt,0.
p(·) Mapping from high-level actions A′i to the re-
duced action space Aredi .
Qt(·, ·) State-action value function at time t.
Qˆ(·, ·) Sequence of Q-function approximations.
R(·) Reward function.
u(·) Signing convention for the volume wrt. the side
(‘Buy” or ‘Sell”) of each order.
V pii(·) Total expected reward function for policy pii.
V pi
FQ
d (·) Return of the fitted Q policy piFQi for day d.
V pi
RI
d (·) Return of the “rolling” intrinsic policy piRIi for
day d.
µt(·) Policy function at time t.
pii(·) Policy followed by agent i.
ρ(·) Trading revenue function.
